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Abstract
In this paper, we aim to develop distributed continuous-time algorithms under directed graphs to seek the Nash equilibrium of a
noncooperative game. Motivated by the existing consensus-based designs in Gadjov and Pavel (2019), we present a distributed
algorithm with a proportional gain for weight-balanced directed graphs. By further embedding a distributed estimator of
the left eigenvector associated with zero eigenvalue of the graph Laplacian, we extend it to the case with arbitrary strongly
connected directed graphs having possible unbalanced weights. In both cases, the Nash equilibrium is proven to be exactly
reached with an exponential convergence rate.
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1 Introduction
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of a noncoopera-
tive game has attracted much attention due to its broad
applications in multi-robot systems, smart grid, and
sensor networks(Li and Bas¸ar, 1987; Basar and Olsder,
1999; Stankovic, Johansson and Stipanovic, 2011). In
a classical full-information setting, each player is re-
quired to have access information including its own
objective function and the decisions taken by the
other players in the game. As the decisions of all
other agents might not be directly available, dis-
tributed designs by using each player’s local in-
formation are of particular interest in past few
years, e.g., Lou, Hong, Xie, Shi and Johansson (2016);
Koshal, Nedic´ and Shanbhag (2016); Ye and Hu (2017);
Zeng, Chen, Liang and Hong (2019); Gadjov and Pavel
(2019); De Persis and Grammatico (2019).
In a very recent work, Gadjov and Pavel (2019) de-
velop a consensus-based rule to share the information of
players through a connected undirected communication
graph. By some passivity-based arguments, the pro-
posed gradient-play dynamics is shown to converge to
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the Nash equilibrium exponentially fast under a graph
coupling condition. The aim of this paper is to extend
this result to directed graphs and favorably with an
exponential convergence rate.
To achieve this goal, we first develop a modified ver-
sion of gradient-play algorithms for weight-balanced di-
graphs by adding a proportional gain. Then, we extend
it to the case with arbitrary strongly connected digraph
by further embedding a distributed estimator of the left
eigenvector associated with zero eigenvalue of the graph
Laplacian. Under some similar assumptions on the cost
functions as those in Gadjov and Pavel (2019), we show
that the developed two algorithms can indeed recover
the expectedNash equilibrium exponentially fast in both
cases. Moreover, by adding such a free-chosen propor-
tional gain parameter to ensure the exponential conver-
gence performance, we provide an alternative way to re-
move the extra graph coupling condition other than sin-
gular perturbation analysis as that in Gadjov and Pavel
(2019). To the best knowledge of us, this is the first ex-
ponentially convergent continuous-time result to solve
the Nash equilibrium seeking problem under general di-
rected graphs.
2 Preliminaries
Let Rn be the n-dimensional Euclidean space and
R
n×m be the set of all n × m matrices. 1n (or 0n)
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denotes an n-dimensional all-one (or all-zero) col-
umn vector and 1n×m (or 0n×m) all-one (or all-zero)
matrix. We may omit the subscript when it is self-
evident. diag{b1, . . ., bn} denotes an n × n diagonal
matrix with diagonal elements bi with i = 1, . . ., n.
col(a1, . . ., an) = [a
⊤
1 , . . ., a
⊤
n ]
⊤ for column vectors ai
with i = 1, . . ., n. For a vector x and a matrix A, ||x||
denotes the Euclidean norm and ||A|| the spectral norm.
A function f : Rm → R is said to be convex if, for any
0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and ζ1, ζ2 ∈ Rm, f(aζ1+(1−a)ζ2) ≤ af(ζ1)+
(1−a)f(ζ2). It is said to be strictly convex if this inequal-
ity is strict whenever ζ1 6= ζ2. A vector-valued function
Φ: Rm → Rm is said to be ω-strongly monotone, if for
any ζ1, ζ2 ∈ Rm, (ζ1−ζ2)⊤[Φ(ζ1)−Φ(ζ2)] ≥ ω‖ζ1−ζ2‖2.
Function Φ: Rm → Rm is said to be ϑ-Lipschitz, if for
any ζ1, ζ2 ∈ Rm, ‖Φ(ζ1)− Φ(ζ2)‖ ≤ ϑ‖ζ1 − ζ2‖.
A weighted directed graph (digraph) is described by G =
(N , E ,A) with the node setN = {1, . . ., N} and the edge
set E . (i, j) ∈ E denotes an edge from node i to node
j. The weighted adjacency matrix A = [aij ] ∈ RN×N is
defined by aii = 0 and aij ≥ 0. Here aij > 0 iff there is
an edge (j, i) in the digraph. The neighbor set of node
i is defined as Ni = {j | (j, i) ∈ E}. A directed path
is an alternating sequence i1e1i2e2. . .ek−1ik of nodes il
and edges em = (im, im+1) ∈ E for l = 1, 2, . . ., k. If
there is a directed path between any two nodes, then
the digraph is said to be strongly connected. The in-
degree and out-degree of node i are defined by dini =∑N
j=1 aij and d
out
i =
∑N
j=1 aji. A digraph is weight-
balanced if dini = d
out
i holds for any i = 1, . . . , N .
The Laplacian matrix of G is defined as L , Din − A
with Din = diag(din1 , . . . , d
in
N ). Note that L1N = 0N
for any digraph. When it is weight-balanced, we have
1⊤NL = 0
⊤
N and the matrix Sym(L) ,
L+L⊤
2 is positive
semidefinite. Let M1 =
1√
N
1N and M2 ∈ RN×(N−1)
be the matrix satisfying M⊤2 M1 = 0N−1, M
⊤
2 M2 =
IN−1 and M2M⊤2 = IN −M1M⊤1 . Then, for a weight-
balanced and strongly connected digraph, we can order
the eigenvalues of Sym(L) as 0 = λ1 < λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λN
and further have λ2IN−1 ≤M⊤2 Sym(L)M2 ≤ λNIN .
3 Problem formulation
In this paper, we consider a multi-agent system consist-
ing ofN agents labeled asN = {1, . . . , N}. They play a
N -player noncooperative game defined as follows. Agent
i is endowed with a continuously differentiable cost func-
tion Ji(zi, z−i), where zi ∈ R denotes the strategy pro-
file of agent i and z−i ∈ RN−1 denote the strategy profile
of this multi-agent system except for agent i 1 . In this
1 The dimension of the decision variable can easily be ex-
tended to multiple dimensional cases without any technical
game, each player seeks to minimize its own cost func-
tion Ji by selecting a proper strategy zi.
The equilibrium point of this game can be defined as in
Basar and Olsder (1999).
Definition 1 Consider the game G = {N , Ji, R}. A
strategy profile z∗ = col(z∗1 , . . . , z
∗
N) is said to be a
Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game G if Ji(z
∗
i , z
∗
−i) ≤
Ji(zi, z
∗
−i) for any i ∈ N and zi ∈ R.
At a Nash equilibrium, no player can unilaterally de-
crease its cost by changing the strategy on its own, and
thus all agents tend to keep at this state. Denote F (y) ,
col(∇1J1(z1, z−1), . . . , ∇NJN (zN , z−N)) ∈ RN with
∇iJi(zi, z−i) , ∂∂zi Ji(zi, z−i) ∈ R. Here, F is called
the pseudogradient associated with J1, . . . , JN .
To ensure the well-posedness of our problem, the follow-
ing assumptions are made.
Assumption 1 For any i ∈ N , the function Ji(zi, z−i)
is twice continuously differentiable, strictly convex and
radially unbounded in zi ∈ R for any fixed z−i ∈ RN−1.
Assumption 2 The pseudogradient F is l-strongly
monotone and l-Lipschitz for two constants l, l > 0.
These assumptions have been used in Gadjov and Pavel
(2019) and De Persis and Grammatico (2019). Under
these assumptions, our game G admits a unique Nash
equilibrium z∗ which can be characterized by the equa-
tion F (z∗) = 0 according to Propositions 1.4.2 and
2.2.7 in Facchinei and Pang (2003).
In a full-information scenario when agents can have ac-
cess to all the other agents’ strategies, a typical gradient-
play rule z˙i = −∂Ji∂zi (zi, z−i) with i = 1, . . . , N can be
used to compute this Nash equilibrium z∗. In this pa-
per, we are more interested in distributed designs and
assume that each agent only knows the strategies of a
subset of all agents during the phase of computation.
For this purpose, a weighted digraph G = (V , E , A) is
used to describe the information sharing relationships
among those agents with node set N and weight ma-
trix A ∈ RN×N . Note that agent i may not have the
full-information of z−i except the case with a complete
communication graph. Thus, we have a noncooperative
game with incomplete partial information. This makes
the classical gradient-play rule unimplementable.
To tackle this issue, a consensus-based rule has been de-
veloped in Gadjov and Pavel (2019) and each agent is re-
obstacles. We adopt a unidimensional decision variable just
for the ease of presentation.
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quired to estimate all other agents’ strategies and imple-
ment an augmented gradient-play dynamics as follows.
z˙i = −
∑N
j=1
aij(z
i − zj)−Ri∇iJi(zi) (1)
whereRi = col(0i−1, 1, 0N−i) and zi = col(zi1, . . . , z
i
N ).
Here, zi ∈ RN represents agent i’s estimate of all agents’
strategies with zi−i = col(z
i
1, . . . , z
i
i−1, z
i
i+1, . . . , z
i
N )
and zii = zi. Function ∇iJi(zi) = ∂Ji∂zi
i
(zii , z
i
−i) is the
partial gradient of agent i’s cost function evaluated at
the local estimate zi.
For convenience, we define an extended pseudogradi-
ent as F (z) = col(∇1J1(z1), . . . , ∇NJN (zN )) ∈ RN for
this game G. The following assumption on this extended
pseudogradient F is made in Gadjov and Pavel (2019).
Assumption 3 The extended pseudogradient F is lF -
Lipschitz with lF > 0.
Let l = max{l, lF }. According to Theorem 2 in
Gadjov and Pavel (2019), along the trajectory of sys-
tem (1), zi(t) will exponentially converge to z∗ as t goes
to +∞ if graph G is undirected and satisfies a strong
coupling condition of the form: λ2 >
l2
l
+ l. Although
this connectivity condition is further relaxed by some
singular perturbation technique, the derived results of
Gadjov and Pavel (2019) are still limited to undirected
graphs.
In this paper, we assume that the information sharing
graph is directed and satisfies the following condition.
Assumption 4 Digraph G is strongly connected.
The main goal of this paper is to exploit the basic idea of
algorithm (1) and develop effective distributed variants
to solve this problem for digraphs under Assumption 4
including undirected connected graphs as a special case.
Since the information flow might be asymmetric in this
case, the resultant equilibrium seeking problem is thus
more challenging than the undirected case.
4 Main result
In this section, we first solve our problem for the weight-
balanced digraphs and then extend it to general strongly
connected ones with unbalanced weights.
4.1 Weight-balanced graph
To begin with, we make the following extra assumption.
Assumption 5 Digraph G is weight-balanced.
Motivated by algorithm (1), we propose a modified ver-
sion of gradient-play rules for game G as follows:
z˙i = −α
∑N
j=1
aij(z
i − zj)−Ri∇iJi(zi) (2)
whereRi, z
i are defined as above and α > 0 is a constant
to be specified later. Putting it into a compact form gives
z˙ = −αLz−RF (z) (3)
where z = col(z1, . . . , zN ), R = diag(R1, . . . , RN ) and
L = L⊗ IN with the extended pseudogradient F (z).
Different from algorithm (1) and its singularly perturbed
extension in Gadjov and Pavel (2019), we add an extra
parameterα to increase the gain of the proportional term
Lz. With this gain being large enough, the effectiveness
of algorithm (3) is shown as follows.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1–5 hold. Let α >
1
λ2
( l
2
l
+ l). Then, for any i ∈ N , along the trajectory of
system (3), zi(t) exponentially converges to z∗ as t goes
to +∞.
Proof. We first show that at the equilibrium of system
(3), zi indeed reaches the Nash equilibrium of game G.
In fact, letting the righthand side of (2) be zero, we
have αLz∗ +RF (z∗) = 0. Premultiplying both sides by
1⊤N ⊗ IN gives
0 = α(1⊤N ⊗ IN )(L⊗ IN )z∗ + (1⊤N ⊗ IN )RF (z∗)
Using 1⊤NL = 0 gives 0 = (1
⊤
N ⊗ IN )RF (z∗). By the
notation of R and F , we have F (z∗) = 0. This further
implies that Lz∗ = 0. Recalling the property of L under
Assumption 4, one can determine some θ ∈ RN such
that z∗ = 1 ⊗ θ. This means F (1 ⊗ θ) = 0 and thus
∇iJi(θi, θ−i) = 0, or equivalently, F (θ) = 0. That is, θ
is the unique Nash equilibrium z∗ of G and z∗ = 1⊗ z∗.
Next, we show the exponential stability of system (3) at
its equilibrium z∗ = 1⊗ z∗. For this purpose, we denote
z˜ = z − z∗ and perform the coordinate transformation
z1 = (M
⊤
1 ⊗ IN )z˜ and z2 = (M⊤2 ⊗ IN )z˜. It follows that
z˙1 = −(M⊤1 ⊗ IN )R∆
z˙2 = −α[(M⊤2 LM2)⊗ IN ]z2 − (M⊤2 ⊗ IN )R∆
where ∆ , F (z) − F (z∗).
Let V (z1, z2) =
1
2 (||z1||2+||z2||2). Then, its time deriva-
3
tive along the trajectory of system (3) satisfies that
V˙ = −z⊤1 (M⊤1 ⊗ IN )R∆− z⊤2 (M⊤2 ⊗ IN )R∆
− αz⊤2 {[M⊤2 LM2]⊗ IN}z2
= −z˜⊤R∆− αz⊤2 [(M⊤2 Sym(L)M2)⊗ IN ]z2
≤ −αλ2||z2||2 − z˜⊤R∆ (4)
Since z˜ = (M1 ⊗ IN )z1 + (M2 ⊗ IN )z2 , z˜1 + z˜2, we
split z˜ into two parts to estimate the above cross term
and obtain that
−z˜⊤R∆ = (z˜1 + z˜2)⊤R[F (z˜1 + z˜2 + z∗)− F (z∗)]
= −z˜⊤1 R[F (z˜1 + z˜2 + z∗)− F (z˜1 + z∗)]
− z˜⊤2 R[F (z˜1 + z˜2 + z∗)− F (z˜1 + z∗)]
− z˜⊤1 R[F (z˜1 + z∗)− F (z∗)]
− z˜⊤2 R[F (z˜1 + z∗)− F (z∗)]
As we have F (1N ⊗y) = F (y) for any y ∈ RN , it follows
by the strong monotonicity of F that
z˜⊤1 R[F (z˜1 + z
∗)− F (z∗)]
=
z⊤1√
N
[F(1⊗ ( z1√
N
+ y∗))− F (1⊗ y∗)]
=
z⊤1√
N
[F (y∗ +
z1√
N
)− F (y∗)]
≥ l
N
||z1||2
where we use the identity (1⊤⊗ IN )R = IN and z˜⊤1 R =
z
⊤
1√
N
. Note that ||R|| = ||M2|| = 1 by definition. This
implies that ||R⊤z˜2|| ≤ ||z˜2|| = ||z2||. Then, under As-
sumptions 2 and 3, we have that
−z˜⊤R∆ ≤ 2l√
N
||z1||||z2||+ l||z2||2 − l
N
||z1||2 (5)
Bringing inequalities (4) and (5) together gives
V˙ ≤ − l
N
||z1||2 − (αλ2 − l)||z2||2 + 2l√
N
||z1||||z2||
= −
[
||z1|| ||z2||
]
Aα
[
||z1||
||z2||
]
(6)
with Aα =

 lN − l√N
− l√
N
αλ2 − l

. When α > 1
λ2
( l
2
l
+ l), ma-
trix Aα is positive definite. Thus, there exists a constant
ν > 0 such that
V˙ ≤ −νV
Recalling Theorem 4.10 in Khalil (2002), one can con-
clude the exponential convergence of z(t) to z∗, which
implies that zi(t) converges to z∗ as t goes to +∞. The
proof is thus complete.
Remark 1 Algorithm (3) is a modified version of the
gradient-play dynamics (1) with an adjustable propor-
tional control gain α. The criterion to choose α clearly
presents a natural trade-off between the control efforts
and graph algebraic connectivity. By choosing a large
enough α, this theorem ensures the exponential conver-
gence of all local estimates to the Nash equilibrium z∗
under weight-balanced digraphs and also provides an al-
ternative way to remove the restrictive graph coupling
condition presented in Gadjov and Pavel (2019).
4.2 Weight-unbalanced graph
In this subsection, we aim to extend the algorithm (3)
for general strongly connected digraphs. Note that the
equilibrium of (3) might not be the Nash equilibrium of
game G without the weight-balanced assumption. In the
following, we first modify (3) to ensure its equilibrium as
the Nash equilibrium of this game, and then implement
it in a distributed manner by adding a compensator.
At first, we assume a left eigenvector of the Laplacian L
associated with the trivial eigenvalue is known and de-
noted by ξ = col(ξ1, . . . , ξN ), i.e., ξ
⊤L = 0. Without
loss of generality, we assume ξ⊤1 = 1. Then, ξ is com-
ponentwise positive by Theorem 4.16 in Chapter 6 of
Berman and Plemmons (1994). Here, we use this vector
ξ to correct the graph imbalance in system (2) as follows.
z˙i = −α
ξi
∑N
j=1
aij(z
i − zj)−Ri∇iJi(zi) (7)
Similar ideas can be found in Lou et al. (2016) and
Hadjicostis, Domı´nguez-Garc´ıa, Charalambous et al.
(2018). Putting this system into a compact form gives:
z˙ = −αLΛz−RF (z) (8)
where Λ = diag( 1
ξ1
, . . . , 1
ξN
) and LΛ = ΛL⊗ IN . It can
be easily verified that ΛL is the associated Laplacian
of a new digraph G′, which has the same connectivity
topology as digraph G but with scaled weights, i.e., a′ij =
aij
ξi
for any i, j ∈ N . As this new digraph G′ is naturally
weight-balanced, we denote λ′2 as the minimal positive
eigenvalue of Sym(ΛL).
Here is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions 1–4 hold and let α >
1
λ′
2
( l
2
l
+ l). Then, for any i ∈ N , along the trajectory of
system (8), zi(t) exponentially converges to z∗ as t goes
to +∞.
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Note that the aforementioned vector ξ is usually un-
known to us for general digraphs. To implement our al-
gorithm, we embed a distributed estimation rule of ξ
into system (7) as follows:
ξ˙i = −
∑N
j=1
aij(ξ
i − ξj) (9)
where ξi = col(ξi1, . . . , ξ
i
N ) with ξ
i
i(0) = 1 and ξ
i
j = 0
for any j 6= i ∈ N .
Here, the diffusion dynamics of ξi is proposed to estimate
the eigenvector ξ by col(ξ11 , . . . , ξ
N
N ). Its effectiveness is
guaranteed by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 4 holds. Then, along the
trajectory of system (9), ξii(t) > 0 for any t ≥ 0 and
exponentially converges to ξi at t goes to +∞.
Proof. Note that the matrix −L is essentially nonneg-
ative in the sense that κI − L is nonnegative for any
sufficiently large constant κ ∈ R. Under Assumption
4, matrix −L is also irreducible. By Theorem 3.12 in
Chapter 6 of Berman and Plemmons (1994), the ma-
trix exponential exp(−Lt) is componentwise positive
for any t ≥ 0. As the evolution of ξi = col(ξ1i , . . . , ξNi )
is governed by ξ˙i = −Lξi with initial condition
ξi(0) = col(0, 1, 0). Thus, ξi(t) = exp(−Lt)ξi(0) > 0
for any t. By further using Theorems 1 and 3 in
Olfati-Saber, Fax and Murray (2007), we have that ξii(t)
exponentially converges to the value ξ∗i =
ξi∑
N
j=1
ξj
for
any i ∈ N as t goes to +∞. Since ξ = col(ξ1, . . . , ξN )
is a left eigenvector of L associated with eigenvalue 0,
one can easily verify that ξ∗⊤L = 0. Under Assump-
tion 4, 0 is a simple eigenvalue of L. Then, there must
be a constant c 6= 0 such that ξ = cξ∗. Note that
ξ⊤1 = ξ∗⊤1 = 1. One can conclude that c = 1 and thus
complete the proof.
The whole algorithm to seek the Nash equilibrium is
presented as follows:
z˙i = − α
ξii
∑N
j=1
aij(z
i − zj)−Ri∇iJi(zi)
ξ˙i = −
∑N
j=1
aij(ξ
i − ξj)
(10)
with ξii(0) = 1 and ξ
i
j = 0 for any j 6= i ∈ N .
Bringing Lemmas 1 and 2 together, we provide the sec-
ond main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1–4 hold and let α >
1
λ′
2
( l
2
l
+ l). Then, for any i ∈ N , along the trajectory of
system (10), zi(t) exponentially converges to z∗ as t goes
to +∞.
Proof. First, we put the algorithm into a compact form:
z˙ = −αLΛ′z−RF (z)
ξ˙ = −Lξ (11)
whereLΛ′ = Λ
′L⊗IN and Λ′ = diag( 1ξ1
1
, . . . , 1
ξN
N
). From
this, one can further find that the composite system con-
sists of two subsystems in a cascaded form as follows
z˙ = −αLΛz−RF (z) − α[(∆ΛL)⊗ IN ]z
ξ˙ = −Lξ
where LΛ is defined as in (8) and ∆Λ = Λ
′ − Λ. Note
that the term α[(∆ΛL)⊗ IN ]z can be upper bounded by
γpexp(−βpt)||z|| for some positive constants γp and βp
according to Lemma 2. By viewing α[(∆ΛL)⊗ IN ]z as a
vanishing perturbation of the upper subsystem, the un-
perturbed z-subsystem is globally exponentially stable
at its equilibrium z∗ = 1N ⊗ z∗ by Lemma 1. Recalling
Corollary 9.1 in Khalil (2002), the whole algorithm (11)
is globally exponentially stable at its equilibrium. This
implies that along the trajectory of system (11), zi(t)
exponentially converges to z∗ as t goes to +∞. The proof
is thus complete.
Remark 2 In contrast to the algorithm (2) with propor-
tional gains in Theorem 1, this new rule (10) further in-
cludes a distributed left eigenvector estimator to compen-
sate the imbalance of the graph Laplacian. Compared with
those equilibrium seeking results in Koshal et al. (2016);
Ye and Hu (2017); Gadjov and Pavel (2019) for undi-
rected graphs, the proportional control and graph imbal-
ance compensator together facilitate us to solve this prob-
lem for strongly connected digraphs including undirected
graphs as its special case.
5 Conclusion
Nash equilibrium seeking problem under directed graphs
was discussed with consensus-based distributed rules.
By selecting some proper proportional gains and embed-
ding a distributed graph imbalance compensator, the
expected Nash equilibrium is shown to be reached expo-
nentially fast for general strongly connected digraphs. It
is interesting to extend this result to a fully distributed
version by some adaptive gain mechanism as that in
De Persis and Grammatico (2019).
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